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Federal Taxation
by Augustus N. Makris'
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article' surveys certain federal tax cases decided by courts in the
Eleventh Circuit in 2010. There were no significant decisions.' The
case of Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v. Commissioner addressed the applicability of section 1031(f)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.)4 to likekind exchanges.' The case of United States v. Fort6 involved a partner
who, in exchange for his interest in an acquired partnership, received
shares of the acquiring corporation subject to certain restrictions. The
issue was whether the restrictions permitted the partner to exclude the

* Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Michigan (B.A., 2003); University of Chicago (J.D., 2006). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of federal tax cases decided the prior survey period, see Dustin M.
Covello & Augustus N. Makris, FederalTaxation,2009 Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 61 MERCER
L. REV. 1133 (2010).
2. The year 2010 saw a number of "tax-protestor" cases in courts in the Eleventh
Circuit. See, e.g., Martins v. United States, No. 10-12086, 2010 WL 4721610 (11th Cir.
Nov. 23, 2010). Perhaps the most colorful of these cases involved movie actor Wesley
Snipes, who appealed his criminal convictions for willfully failing to file federal income tax
returns. See United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 859 (11th Cir. 2010). Snipes made
several arguments justifying his failure to file his personal tax returns, including
that he was a non-resident alien to the United States, that earned income must
come from sources wholly outside the United States, that a taxpayer is defined by
law as one who operates a distilled spirit Plant, that the Internal Revenue Code's
taxing authority is limited to the District of Columbia and insular possessions of
the United States, exclusive of the 50 States of the Union, [and] that as a
fiduciary of God, who is a nontaxpayer, he was a foreign diplomat who was not
obliged to pay taxes.
Id. at 860 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. 613 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. 2010).
4. I.R.C. § 1031(fX4) (2006).
5. Ocmulgee Fields, 613 F.3d at 1361.
6. 105 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2559 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
7. Id. at 2560.
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shares from gross income when received.' The case of Southern Family
Insurance Co. v. United States9 addressed whether "takeout bonuses"
paid by a state to an insurance company were included in gross income
or excluded from gross income as nonshareholder contributions to
capital.o
II.

OCMULGEE FIELDS, INC. V. COMMISSIONER

"When a taxpayer exchanges one property for another, the exchange
is typically treated for tax purposes as a sale of the relinquished
property followed by a purchase of the received property."n Under
I.R.C. § 1001(c), 12 the taxpayer must immediately recognize the gains
or losses realized." Under I.R.C. § 1031(a),14 however, gain or loss is
not recognized on exchanges of certain business or investment property
"solely for [other] property of like kind."" The long-standing concept
underlying I.R.C. § 103116 is that when a taxpayer exchanges one
property (the "relinquished property") for a replacement property of likekind (the "replacement property"), the taxpayer is continuing an ongoing
investment, rather than disposing of one property to obtain another."
Accordingly, gain or loss is not recognized, and under I.R.C. § 1031(d)
the taxpayer's basis in the relinquished property carries over to the
replacement property.18
The transfer of the relinquished property in exchange for the
replacement property need not be simultaneous. I.R.C. § 1031(aX3) can
apply to a "deferred exchange," defined by the regulations "as an
exchange in which, pursuant to an agreement, the taxpayer transfers
[the relinquished] property . . . and subsequently receives [the replacement] property."" Generally, the replacement property must be
identified within 45'days and received within 180 days of the transfer
of the relinquished property.20

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See id. at 2560-61.
106 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 7200 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
Id. at 7200.
Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v. Comm'r, 613 F.3d 1360, 1364 (11th Cir. 2010).
I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2006).
Id.
I.R.C. § 1031(a) (2006).
Id.
I.R.C. § 1031 (2006).
Ocmulgee Fields, 613 F.3d at 1364.
I.R.C. § 1031(d).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(a) (as amended in 2008).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(b) (as amended in 2008).
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I.R.C. § 1031(aX3), however, does not alter the rule that I.R.C. § 1031
applies only to exchanges of property and not cash sales, which can
make deferred exchanges difficult to execute.2 1 For example, if a
taxpayer sells the relinquished property for cash and then uses the cash
to purchase replacement property, gain or loss is recognized on the sale
even if the transaction falls within the 45-day and 180-day windows.
The regulations provide various rules designed to mitigate this and
other problems presented by deferred exchanges. Under one such rule,
if a taxpayer transfers the relinquished property to a "qualified
intermediary," and the qualified intermediary sells the relinquished
property for cash proceeds, then, generally, the proceeds held by the
qualified intermediary are not considered to be received by the taxpayer. 2 This rule permits a qualified intermediary to effect a deferred
exchange by collecting cash proceeds from the sale of the taxpayer's
relinquished property without the recognition of gain, using the cash
proceeds to purchase the replacement property and transferring the
replacement property to the taxpayer.
Prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 1031(f) in 1989,24 related taxpayers
acted in concert to exploit the nonrecognition treatment and carry-over
basis provisions of I.R.C. § 1031.25 According to the House Ways and
Means Committee,
Because a like-kind exchange results in the substitution of the basis of
the exchanged property for the property received, related parties have
engaged in like-kind exchanges of high basis property for low basis
property in anticipation of the sale of the low basis property in order
to reduce or avoid the recognition of gain on the subsequent sale.....

The committee believes that if a related party exchange is followed
shortly thereafter by a disposition of the property, the related parties
have, in effect, "cashed out" of the investment, and the original
exchange should not be accorded nonrecognition treatment.26
I.R.C. § 1031(fX1) provides that when a taxpayer exchanges property
with a "related person" (as defined in I.R.C. § 1031(f)(3)), gain or loss
that would otherwise escape recognition is recognized by the taxpayer if

21. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(f)(1) (as amended in 2008).
22. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(gX4) (as amended in 2008).
23. See id.
24. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C. (2006)).
25. Ocmulgee Fields, 613 F.3d at 1366.
26. H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 1340 (1989), reprintedin 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2810.
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the taxpayer or the related person disposes of the property exchanged or
I.R.C.
received by the taxpayer within two years of the exchange.
§ 1031(f(2) can save nonrecognition treatment if the taxpayer establishes that neither the exchange nor the subsequent disposition of the
exchanged property was principally motivated by the avoidance of
federal tax."
An additional limitation is provided for in I.R.C. § 1031(f)(4), which
disallows nonrecognition treatment for "any exchange which is part of
a transaction (or series of transactions) structured to avoid the purposes
of"' I.R.C. § 1031(f).2 "Congress enacted § 1031(f)(4) to prevent related
parties from structuring transactions in a manner that avoided the
technical provisions of § 1031(f)(1) but achieved the same result
§ 1031(0(1) was designed to prevent."o
1 The
I.R.C. 1031(f)(4) was at issue in the case of Ocmulgee Fields."
case dealt with an exchange that involved four parties: "(1) Ocmulgee
Fields (the taxpayer); (2) Treaty Fields (a related person); (3) the
McEachern Family Trust (an unrelated purchaser of property); and (4)
Security Bank of Bibb County (Security Bank) (a qualified intermediary)." 32 Ocmulgee Fields was taxable as a corporation, and Treaty
Fields was taxable as a partnership." Each entity was a real estate
development and management company owned by members of the same
family. 4 Thus, they were related persons under I.R.C. § 1031(f)(3).
Ocmulgee Fields had a basis in its property, Wesleyan Station, of
$716,164." Ocmulgee Fields conveyed Wesleyan Station to Security
Bank, which sold it to the McEachern Family Trust for $6,838,900,
causing Ocmulgee Fields to realize a gain of $6,122,736. Security Bank
then used the proceeds to purchase the Barnes & Noble Corner property
from Treaty Fields for $6,740,900. Treaty Fields' basis in that property
was $2,554,901, so the sale caused Treaty Fields to recognize a gain of
$4,185,999. Next, Security Bank transferred the Barnes & Noble Corner
property to Ocmulgee Fields. If Ocmulgee Fields had immediately
recognized the $6,122,736 gain it realized, it would have been taxed at

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

I.R.C. § 1031(f)(1).
I.R.C. § 1031(f)(2)(C).
I.R.C. § 1031(f)(4).
Ocmulgee Fields, 613 F.3d at 1367.
See id. at 1361.
Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1363.

FEDERAL TAXATION

2011]

1191

a 34% corporate tax rate, yielding an immediate tax liability of more
than $2 million. Because Treaty Fields was a partnership, it passed the
$4,185,999 gain recognized on its sale through to its partners who were
taxed at a 15% rate.3 6
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a deficiency against
Ocmulgee Fields, asserting that Ocmulgee Fields failed to meet all of the
requirements of I.R.C. § 1031(f) and, consequently, incurred approximately $2 million in additional tax liability. The United States Tax
Court agreed with the IRS and held that the exchange was not entitled
to nonrecognition treatment under I.R.C. § 1031(f)(4). Ocmulgee Fields
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
appealed.
Circuit affirmed the decision of the tax court.
The decision in the case can be best understood if it is considered in
light of an alternative set of facts. Again, Ocmulgee Fields, which owned
Wesleyan Station (basis $716,164), and Treaty Fields, which owned
Barnes & Noble Corner (basis $2,554,901), were owned by members of
Suppose the family wanted to cash in its investthe same family.
ment in Wesleyan Station. Prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 1031(f), the
family had at least two options. First, it could have simply caused
Ocmulgee Fields to sell Wesleyan Station to a third party for $6,838,900,
recognizing gain of $6,122,736. Alternatively, Ocmulgee Fields could
have transferred Wesleyan Station to Treaty Fields for Barnes & Noble
Corner in an exchange qualifying under I.R.C. § 1031(a). Under I.R.C.
§ 1031(d), Treaty Fields would have had a carryover basis in Wesleyan
Station of $2,554,901. On the following day, Treaty Fields could have
sold Wesleyan Station to a third party for $6,838,900, recognizing a gain
of $4,283,999. The second option would have reduced the gain recognized on the sale of Wesleyan Station by $2,554,901 ($6,838,900 minus
$4,283,999).
I.R.C. 1031(f)(1) closes the door on the second option. As stated above,
I.R.C. § 1031(f)(1) denies nonrecognition treatment on an exchange if the
related person disposes of the relinquished property "before the date 2
years after the date of the last transfer which was part of [the] exchange.')o
In its tax return for the relevant year, Ocmulgee Fields identified its
like-kind exchange with Security Bank (an unrelated party) as one that

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
I.R.C.

1362-63.
1363-64.
1364.
1363.
§ 1031(f(1).
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qualified for nonrecognition treatment under I.R.C. § 1031(a)."' Thus,

I.R.C. § 1031(f)(1) did not technically apply to deny nonrecognition. But,
according to the court, the only purpose of interposing Security Bank
was to avoid the application of I.R.C. § 1031(f)(1). Thus I.R.C. §
1031(f)(4) applied.
Moreover .. . we can look to the unneeded complexity in the series of
transactions to help us in inferring Ocmulgee Fields' intent. ...
Ocmulgee Fields could have achieved the same result by simply
engaging in a direct exchange of property with Treaty Fields, and
Treaty Fields could have then sold Wesleyan Station to the McEachern
Family Trust. If Ocmulgee Fields had taken this approach, however,
§ 1031(f)(1) would have automatically disallowed nonrecognition
treatment for the exchange because Treaty Fields disposed of Wesleyan
Station within two years of the exchange.. . . Therefore, unless
Ocmulgee Fields offered a persuasive justification for the complexity of
its transactions, we can infer that Ocmulgee Fields added layers of
complexity to avoid the purposes of § 1031(f).
Ocmulgee Fields offered no such persuasive justification and,
therefore, the court held that the exchange was "structured to avoid the
purposes of § 1031(f)."3
Thus, the court denied nonrecognition
treatment under I.R.C. § 1031(f(4)." In short, Ocmulgee Fields stands
for the proposition that parties to an I.R.C. § 1031 like-kind exchange
cannot, as part of a deferred exchange, circumvent the prohibition in
I.R.C. § 1031(f)(1) on selling the relinquished property within two years
of the exchange by selling the relinquished property through a qualified
intermediary before the exchange is complete.4 ' According to the court,
such transactions are "the economic equivalent of a direct related-party
exchange for which § 1031(f) would disallow nonrecognition treatment. ""

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

613 F.3d at 1363.
Id. at 1369-70.
Id. at 1370, 1373.
Id. at 1373.
See id. at 1369-70.
Id. at 1369.
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UNITED STATES V. FORT

The case of United States v. Fort47 involved Cap Gemini's 2000
purchase of an information technology consulting firm owned by Ernst
& Young. As part of the transaction, Ernst &Young partners exchanged
their partnership interests in the firm for shares of Cap Gemini, which
was a publicly-traded French corporation. In 2000 Cap Gemini
transferred 25% of the agreed-upon shares to the Ernst & Young
partners, and Merrill Lynch held the remaining 75% of shares in
accounts for each partner. The shares held in the Merrill Lynch
accounts could not be sold for up to five years. If a partner quit, was
fired, or engaged in competition with Cap Gemini, the shares held in the
Merrill Lynch account would be forfeited. To account for these
restrictions, the restricted shares were valued at 95% of the closing price
of Cap Gemini stock on the closing date."
Danny Fort, a former Ernst & Young partner, reported the shares he
received (including the restricted shares) as income on his 2000 tax
return. The share price plummeted in the following years. After the
drop in price, Fort filed an amended tax return, requesting a refund on
the grounds that the restricted shares were subject to substantial
restrictions and therefore should not have been considered income in
2000. The IRS granted the refund and then brought suit to recover the
refund issued."
Under I.R.C. § 61,o gross income includes all income "that is actually
or constructively received during the taxable year."' The issue was
whether Fort constructively received the restricted shares originally
claimed as income in 2000.52 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia wrote that "the key to constructive receipt
is control."" "A taxpayer constructively receives income if the income
is credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available
so that he may draw upon it at any time." 4 Constructive receipt does
not occur, however, "if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

105 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2559 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
Id. at 2560.
Id.
I.R.C. § 61 (2006).
Fort, 105 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) at 2560.
Id.
Id. at 2561.
Id. at 2560-61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Fort argued that the sale
substantial limitations or restrictions."'
restriction and the forfeiture provision imposed substantial restrictions
on his control of the shares and, therefore, he did not constructively
receive them in 2000.56
The court disagreed and held that Fort "exercised substantial control
over all of the shares in 2000," notwithstanding the restrictions.5 7 The
court found the following facts persuasive:
[Fort] alone stood to gain or lose money based on the stock's performance. He received the benefit of the dividends paid on the shares,
and he had the right to direct how the shares would be voted.... [H]e
knowingly agreed to the sale restriction and the forfeiture provision.
He also agreed to the amount of the discount.68
The forfeiture provision did not prevent Fort from constructively
receiving the shares." The court wrote, "the fact that the partners
risked having to return some of their shares at a later time does not
mean that they did not constructively receive the shares in the first
place."60 The court noted that "several courts have held that, where
stock is transferred under a sales agreement and held in escrow to
guarantee a party's performance under the agreement, the party receives
the stock when it is placed in escrow rather than when it is released."
Therefore, the court held "that Fort constructively received the shares
in 2000.,"62
The court noted that its finding was consistent with the contemporaneous holdings of other courts that had considered the tax consequences
of the exact same type of transaction." In addition, the court noted
that its holding was "consistent with the parties' original intentions."'
Moreover, the court understood that the parties structured the
transaction as they did because the Ernst & Young partners expected
the shares to appreciate and wanted to recognize all of the income from

55. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979).
56. Fort, 105 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) at 2561.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting United States v. Fletcher, 562 F.3d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 2009)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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the transaction in 2000." Any appreciation would therefore be taxed
as capital gain.66 "[Wihile a taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as
he chooses, nevertheless, once having done so, he must accept the tax
consequences of his choice whether contemplated or not, and may not
enjoy the benefit of some other route he might have chosen to follow but
did not."
IV.

SOUTHERN FAMILY INSURANCE COMPATY V. UNITED STATES

The case of Southern Family Insurance Co. v. United States,6 8
addressed whether "takeout bonuses" paid by a state to an insurance
company were included in gross income or excluded from gross income
as nonshareholder contributions to capital." Following the aftermath
of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, a number of property and casualty
insurers ceased writing or renewing windstorm insurance policies in
Florida. As a result, the state of the Florida and its residents faced an
insurance crisis. In response to the crisis, the State passed legislation
creating the Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting
Association (JUA) as a windstorm insurer of last resort.
The JUA's business grew rapidly, and after only eighteen months of
operation, the JUA had become the third largest insurer in the State.
In order to encourage private insurers to re-enter the market, the State
passed legislation that provided "takeout bonuses" to private insurers for
each risk they removed from the JUA. The takeout bonuses were not,
however, paid to the insurers immediately. Instead, the takeout bonuses
were paid into an escrow account. The trustee of the escrow was
permitted to release the takeout bonuses only after certain conditions
were satisfied.o
Generally, insurers were required to provide coverage under a policy
for three years before the corresponding funds were released. Upon the
expiration of the three-year period, the JUA would conduct an audit to
determine whether the insurer had provided the applicable insurance
and otherwise complied with the conditions. Following the audit, the
takeout bonuses, together with any interest, were released to the

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Comm'r v. Nat'l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling
Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. 106 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 7200 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
69. Id. at 7200.
70. Id.
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insurer. State law required the takeout bonuses, once released to an
insurer, to be credited to the insurer's capital and surplus. Any portion
of the funds deemed not payable to the insurer would be returned to the
JUA.7
The Southern Family Insurance Company (Southern Family) was
formed in 1996 to write residential insurance policies and ultimately
took over thousands of policies from the JUA. As a result, the JUA
deposited takeout bonuses into an escrow account pursuant to an escrow
agreement between the JUA and Southern Family. The takeout bonuses
relevant to this case were deposited in the escrow account during the
calendar years 1996-1999. During those years, the JUA deposited into
escrow the following takeout bonuses for policies transferred to Southern
Family: $7,125,000 for 1996; $4,754,281 for 1997; $2,430,458 for 1998;
and $832,100 for 1999. During the escrow periods, many policies were
cancelled or not renewed. As a result, at the end of the escrow periods,
the escrow agent released to the Southern Family: $6,876,500 for 1996;
$4,859,913 for 1997; $2,392,590 for 1998; and $394,050 for 1999.72
The JUA approved the first release of funds to Southern Family in
1999. These funds related to policies "taken out" by Southern Family
during the 1996 taxable year. Southern Family accounted for these
takeout bonuses as a direct contribution to capital and surplus and did
not report them as taxable premium income on its 1999 federal income
tax return. For the taxable years 1996-1998, Southern Family did not
file a stand-alone tax return, as it had in 1999. Rather, Poe Financial
Group, Inc. (Poe Financial), the common parent of a group of corporations that included Southern Family, filed a consolidated return.
Following an examination of the consolidated tax returns for 19961998 along with Southern Family's 1999 tax return, the IRS issued
notices of deficiency to Poe Financial for 1996-1998 and Southern Family
for 1999. The IRS determined that the taxpayers had improperly
treated the takeout bonuses as capital contributions and therefore had
erroneously excluded the payments from gross income. The taxpayers
paid the deficiencies and filed for refunds, which the IRS denied. The
taxpayers filed refund actions in a federal district court. That court

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 7200-01.
Id. at 7201-02.
Id. at 7202.
Id.
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held that the takeout bonuses were appropriately characterized as
nonshareholder capital contributions. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
I.R.C. § 61(a) states the following: "Except as otherwise provided in
this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source
derived."7 I.R.C. § 118(a)" excludes from gross income "any contribution to the capital of the taxpayer." 8 Under Treasury Regulation
§ 1.118-1,71 contributions to capital can be money or property and can
be made by either a shareholder or a nonshareholder." Respecting
nonshareholder capital contributions, I.R.C. § 1.118-1 provides contrasting examples:
For example, the exclusion applies to the value of land or other
property contributed to a corporation by a governmental unit or by a
civic group for the purpose of inducing the corporation to locate its
business in a particular community, or for the purpose of enabling the
corporation to expand its operating facilities. However, the exclusion
does not apply to any money or property transferred to the corporation
in consideration for goods or services rendered, or to subsidies paid for
the purpose of inducing the taxpayer to limit production.8 '
Citing Supreme Court of the United States and Eleventh Circuit
precedent, the Middle District of Florida held that the determination of
whether a nonshareholder contribution of money or property is included
in gross income as a payment for services turns on the intent of the
contributor.82 The court wrote that when a transferor makes "payments with the intention of receiving a direct benefit in the form of
specific services, the payments [cannot] be considered a contribution to
capital."' In contrast, when a transferor contributes capital with the
intention of benefiting the community generally, the contribution is
treated as a nonshareholder capital contribution."8

75. Id.
76. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006).
77. I.R.C. § 118(a) (2006).
78. Id.
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (2001).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Southern Family, 106 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) at 7203.
83. Id. (quoting United States v. Coastal Utilities, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1239
(S.D. Ga. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. See id. at 7203-04.
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Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner' involved transfers of cash and
other property made by civic groups to induce the taxpayer to build and
operate facilities in their communities or expand the facilities already
there." The civic groups "expected only that the transactions would
benefit the community at large by providing jobs[;] there were 'neither
customers nor payments for service.'"' The Supreme Court has recited
five other characteristics of nonshareholder capital contributions:
[1] [The contributed capital] must become a permanent part of the
transferee's working capital structure. [2] It may not be compensation
. . . for a specific, quantifiable service.... [3] It must be bargained for.

[4] [It] must result in benefit to the transferee in an amount commensurate with its value. And [5] the asset ordinarily ... will be employed
in or contribute to the production of additional income."
In Southern Family, the Middle District of Florida held "that it was
the intent and motivation of the Florida Legislature and the JUA for the
takeout bonuses to constitute nonshareholder contributions to capital."' That conclusion was consistent with state law, which expressly
required insurers to credit the takeout bonuses to capital and surplus.o
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the court found that the
purpose of the program was to benefit the Florida insurance market
generally by providing an incentive to bring capital into Florida for the
creation of insurance companies that would provide coverage to Florida
The JUA "was not paying for any specific good or
homeowners."
service."2 Of course, Southern Family did transfer economic value to
the JUA when Southern Family assumed a portion of the JUA's
liabilities. The court did not address this issue. Accordingly, the court
held that "the takeout bonuses were nonshareholder contributions to
capital and thus excludable from gross income."'

85. 339 U.S. 583 (1950).
86. Id. at 584.
87. Southern Family, 106 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) at 7203 (quoting United States v. Coastal
Utilities, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1240 (S.D. Ga. 2007)).
88. Id. at 7203-04 (quoting United States v. Coastal Utilities, 483 F. Supp. 1232, 124041 (S.D. Ga. 2007)).
89. Id. at 7204.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.

